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I Viewpoint by CARL TOBIAS 
Legislating without deliberation 
Lawmakers must employ thorough procedures when 
legislating changes that may seriously affect individual 
rights or a co-equal branch. 
Several years ago, Third Circuit 
Judge Edward R. Becker trenchantly 
admonished Congress to improve 
the quality of its legislation, espe-
cially lawmaking that affects the fed-
eral judiciary.' Since Judge Becker 
published that article, the situation 
apparently has deteriorated. 
Congress has recently exhibited a 
striking and troubling propensity to 
enact substantive laws outside the 
normal legislative processes. Illustra-
tive are recent efforts to legislate in 
fields that profoundly affect 
detainees who seek federal court 
relief from incarceration, and the 
federal judiciary, a co-equal govern-
mental branch. One of these 
attempts proved successful and the 
other did not in the initial session of 
the 109th Congress. 
The first example involves the 500 
persons detained by the U.S. as 
alleged terrorists at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. On November 10, 2005, 
the Senate adopted 49-42 an amend-
ment to the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act, which would have 
abrogated federal court jurisdiction 
over the detainees' pending and 
future habeas corpus petitions. On 
November 15, senators adopted 84-
14 a compromise that tempered 
some of the amendment's worst fea-
tures, but it was not a comprehensive 
solution. In late December, as Con-
gress raced to recess, it passed the 
compromise with little change, and 
on December 30 President George 
W. Bush signed the measure into law. 
The substance of the amendment, 
the compromise, and the final ver-
sion, as well as the severely truncated 
processes by which Congress 
approved them, were mistaken. 
The amendment purportedly 
removed Supreme Court jurisdiction 
to decide the legality of military tri-
bunals created by unilateral execu-
tive action four years ago. It also 
eroded one 2004 Court opinion, 
which ruled that due process applies 
to persons labeled "enemy combat-
ants" and prescribed standards for 
challenging those designations, and 
a second, which held federal courts 
have jurisdiction over Guantanamo 
detainees' habeas petitions. The 
amendment drastically limited fed-
eral court habeas review and seri-
ously undermined separation of 
powers by assigning basic human 
rights protection almost completely 
to the executive. 
Sharp criticism of the amendment 
led to the hastily assembled compro-
mise that the Senate adopted 
November 15, but this compromise 
raised more questions than it 
answered. For instance, it arguably 
required that the Supreme Court 
appeal of military tribunals' validity 
and the 200 pending habeas peti-
tions be dismissed. Moreover, the 
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compromise appeared to govern 
only detainees at Guantanamo. In 
late December, lawmakers passed the 
compromise with few changes. 
Congress adopted the amend-
ment, the compromise, and the final 
legislation after minimal considera-
tion. The Senate Armed Services, 
Foreign Relations, and Judiciary 
committees have the responsibility, 
and the expertise, to address the crit-
ical issues raised, but they failed to do 
so. Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), the 
Judiciary chair, voted against the 
amendment, the compromise, and 
the final bill. He observed that 
attempts to treat the questions were 
short circuited, admonishing: "When 
you undertake to remove habeas cor-
pus, you better have a comprehensive 
plan." Specter was vindicated in Janu-
ary when the Department of Justice 
sought the pending cases' dismissal 
by arguing-contrary to apparent 
congressional intent-that Congress 
meant the law to be retroactive. 
Circuit splitting 
The second illustration relates to 
perennially offered legislation that 
would split the Ninth Circuit. In 
early 2005, Representative James 
Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), the House 
Judiciary Committee chair, spon-
sored a circuit-splitting proposal that 
also authorized new judgeships for 
appellate and district courts. On 
October 27, the committee adopted 
this measure, a day after the Senate 
Judiciary Committee conducted a 
hearing on its version of the circuit-
splitting bill. In early November, 
House members inserted in a deficit 
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reduction bill a circuit-division provi-
sion, thereby avoiding Senate Judi-
ciary Committee approval of an issue 
essential to the federal courts. On 
November 18, the House passed that 
bill with the circuit-division provi-
sion. This maneuver enabled propo-
nents to circumvent normal 
legislative evaluation. On December 
19, Congress omitted the circuit-
bifurcation proviso from the final 
legislation. 
Both examples illustrate inadvis-
able use of the legislative process, 
although ultimately Congress refused 
to split the Ninth Circuit in this way. 
Lawmakers must employ thorough 
procedures when legislating changes 
that may seriously affect individual 
rights or a co-equal branch. Any idea 
that modifies federal court jurisdic-
tion, changes habeas corpus, affects 
international relations, and impli-
cates the "war on terrorism," or dra-
matically alters federal court 
structure, would typically receive the 
complete panoply of legislative pro-
cedures. The proposal would be 
embodied in a bill introduced in 
both houses, assigned to committees 
with jurisdiction, receive hearings at 
which experts testify, revised in 
markups, voted on, and sent to the 
floor where it would be fully debated 
and amended, if necessary. It would 
then be sent to the other house and 
modified in conference committee, 
should the two houses disagree. Only 
then would it be passed. 
The litigation that the hastily 
assembled Detainee Treatment Act 
provoked less than a week after Pres-
ident Bush signed it attests to the 
problems with short circuiting thor-
ough legislative processes. Members 
of the 109th Congress's second ses-
sion who still believe that Ninth Cir-
cuit division is warranted should not 
short circuit those processes. ¢'¢ 
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Editorial 
(continued from page 192) 
fully adopted in a carpetbag in South 
Dakota, it would receive a more 
enthusiastic reception in California. 
We are reminded of a federal judge's 
wise observation: "Give a bad dogma 
a good name and its bite may 
become as bad as its bark." 
We hope and expect that the vot-
ers of South Dakota will greet this 
attempt to export an unnatural dis-
aster just as they would an attempt to 
export California's natural disasters. 
There is no need to "restore judicial 
accountability and a perception of 
justice" in South Dakota. South 
Dakota judges, who must stand for 
election or retention election, are 
already amply accountable because 
of that fact, because most of their 
decisions are subject to appellate 
review, and because the state has a 
system for investigating and impos-
ing discipline for judicial miscon-
duct. 
Even if there were a problem of 
judicial misconduct in South Dakota, 
].A.LL. would not be a good solu-
tion. Apart from the fact that most of 
the conduct it targets would not be 
shielded by immunity under existing 
law, at least one of its standards is so 
vague as to invite abuse, and its pro-
visions on attorney appointment and 
reimbursement for judges would 
leave them hopelessly exposed to dis-
appointed litigants. South Dakota 
voters will surely recognize that, as 
scholars have pointed out, without 
judicial immunity for most judicial 
acts judges, including judges in elec-
tive systems, would lack the inde-
pendence necessary to apply the law 
without fear or favor. 
An organization in which non-
lawyers are both members and lead-
ers, AJS supports judicial accounta-
bility through its Center for Judicial 
Ethics and Task Force on Judicial 
Independence and Accountability. 
We reject both thoughtless support 
of, and thoughtless attacks on, 
judges. J.A.1.L. is a thoughtless 
attack. We do not believe that South 
Dakotans are so radical that they 
would tamper with the essential 
structure of their government-as 
they would if they adopted this 
amendment crippling their judici-
ary-without any reason to do so. ¢!¢ 
And so, encouraged by the presence of a waiting jury, 
parties resolved their dispute without going to trial. 
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